Home > Opinions > Treading carefully on China and Tibet

Treading carefully on China and Tibet

By David L Phillips

David L Phillips is director of the Programme on Conflict Prevention and Peace building at American University. Photographer unknown

The Obama administration achieved a rare moment of bipartisanship in deciding not receive the Dalai Lama at the White House this week. Both Democrats and Republicans found common ground criticising the administration for kow-towing to China. But the decision to defer an Oval Office meeting is based on careful calculation. Instead of a photo-opportunity with the Dalai Lama, the administration believes it would be better to focus on diplomacy to restart negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama’s envoys that were suspended last year.

Beginning in 2002, the Dalai Lama’s envoys made their first of seven trips to China. Initial discussions focused on building confidence. The envoys reaffirmed the Dalai Lama’s renunciation of independence in lieu of “genuine autonomy” consistent with “the one-China line.” They insisted that China’s territorial integrity would be strengthened — not weakened — through power sharing with Tibetans.

The Chinese government was initially apprehensive that autonomy would be a step on the path to independence. But after repeated assurances, China’s tone and message gradually changed. They acknowledged the need to “perfect” arrangements for autonomy; “adapt” measures to local conditions; and “improve” the country’s legal system.

With the atmosphere improving, the envoys submitted a concept paper defining the meaning of “genuine autonomy.” The paper included specific proposals for local control over governance and cultural, religious, economic, and environmental affairs. It also suggested that autonomy should be uniformly applied in all parts of western China where ethnic Tibetans reside.

Chinese officials balked at many of the proposed provisions. They saw the proposal as a Trojan horse for creating a “greater Tibet” in designated Tibetan autonomous areas Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, and Szechuan provinces as well as the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. It was rejected out-of-hand.

The failed negotiations, combined with China’s harsh rule, precipitated protests by Tibetans in March 2008. Demonstrations started in the monasteries and escalated into a larger rebellion that quickly spread across the Tibetan plateau.

Fast-forward to the present. Obama has a long list of items to discuss with President Hu Jintao when they meet next month in Beijing. He knows that multilateralism cannot succeed without China’s cooperation on a whole host of issues, including the global economic crisis, global warming, and nuclear nonproliferation.

However, Obama should not turn a blind eye to human rights in China. He should point out that stability is essential for social and economic development, and that China’s stability will give it greater self-confidence on the world stage.

Obama should emphasise that, absent progress, Tibetans will become radicalized and the present opportunity to negotiate an autonomy arrangement that strengthens China’s territorial integrity could disappear. The Dalai Lama is best placed to endorse an arrangement that advances China’s interests as well as the interests of Tibetans. In exchange for verifiable autonomy, the Dalai Lama would put his moral authority behind an agreement that precludes separation or Tibetan independence.

Restarting negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s envoys would be a good first step. But talks are not enough. The United States must be prepared to closely monitor talks between Beijing and the Tibetan envoys, give ideas, and use its influence to sustain momentum when dialogue falters.

To be sure, there are risks in deferring the Dalai Lama’s visit from October to December. China could reject Obama’s advice to restart negotiations or it could resume negotiations without the prerequisite sincerity to realise a solution. China might also claim that it intimidated the Obama administration, thereby making it harder for other heads of state to resist its demarches.

One thing is sure. China will not resume negotiations unless Obama can convince Hu that changing course is in China’s national interest. While diplomacy is more difficult, engagement has the potential to be far more effective than the immediate gratification of a photo-op. That can wait until mid-December, when plans are in the works for Obama to receive the Dalai Lama in a fashion becoming the Tibetan leader’s stature.

Copyright © 2009 Globe Newspaper Company.

Published in Boston Globe